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The Unappealing Nature of Guilty Plea 
Agreements: Johnson’s Restrictions on 
Appeals of Intellectual Disabilities 
Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
Alexander M. Brown* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In 2008, Ronald Johnson was charged with the murder of Luke Meiners, 
a St. Louis attorney.1  On the advice of his appointed defense counsel, Johnson 
pleaded guilty to the charge of first-degree murder to avoid the death penalty.2  
Johnson was ineligible, however, for the death penalty because he was 
intellectually disabled.3  After his conviction, Johnson appealed for post-
conviction relief.4  Johnson received a mental evaluation, which concluded he 
was competent to stand trial.5  Thus, the court upheld his guilty plea.6  In an 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Johnson argued that his conviction 
should be set aside because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and 
was coerced into accepting his plea.7  The Supreme Court of Missouri avoided 
the merits of Johnson’s appeal because of its technical deficiencies.8  The 
court further confused the established standards for competency to stand trial 
and intellectual disability in a way that will affect the rights of intellectually 
disabled individuals.9   
Part II of this Note examines the pertinent facts and holding of the case.  
Part III analyzes the legal standards for competency to stand trial, the death 
penalty in relation to intellectual disability, and claims of ineffective 
 
* B.A., William Woods University Fulton-Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University 
of Missouri School of Law, 2021; Lead Article Editor, Missouri Law Review. 
 1.  Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 899. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 899–900. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 908. 
 9.  Id. at 914 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
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assistance of counsel.  Finally, Part IV considers how the court’s rulings in 
this case caused injustice to Ronald Johnson and how it will affect the plea-
bargaining process for individuals with intellectual disabilities in Missouri 
moving forward. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Ronald Johnson was diagnosed with mild mental retardation at ten years 
old when he was found to have an Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) of fifty-three.10  
For the rest of his school career, he was in special education classes until he 
dropped out in the tenth grade.11  Additionally, Johnson suffered from a 
seizure disorder and developed schizophrenia, which caused  hallucinations 
for which he was repeatedly hospitalized and placed on disability.12  Johnson 
began a long-term romantic relationship with a man named Cleophus King in 
his late teens.13  In 2008, Johnson and King were charged with murder in St. 
Louis, Missouri.14  Johnson and his accomplice were recorded on audio killing 
a local attorney, a friend of Johnson, and then robbing the victim.15  The State 
offered not to pursue the death penalty if Johnson would agree to plead guilty 
to the murder.16  Johnson’s counsel advised him to accept the State’s offer 
because the evidence against him was strong, and the violent nature of the 
crime would have been damaging at trial.17  Johnson accepted the plea 
agreement.18  At the plea hearing, Johnson affirmed that he had discussed the 
case with his attorney, understood the charges, and desired to plead guilty.19  
Johnson further affirmed that he did not have any mental disability that would 
affect his participation in his defense or his understanding of the proceedings 
 
 10.  Appellant’s Substitute Statement, Brief and Argument at 20, Johnson v. 
State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (No. SC97330). 
 11.  Appellant’s Substitute Statement, supra note 10 at 5. 
 12.  Appellant’s Substitute Statement, supra note 10 at 34. 
 13.  Appellant’s Substitute Statement, supra note 10 at 5. 
 14.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 895. 
 15. Id.  The attorney, Luke Meiners, had befriended Johnson, age 25.  Johnson 
and his lover/accomplice Cleophus King conspired to rob Meiners.  On the night of 
the murder, Johnson asked Meiners for a ride to King’s house so he could do laundry.  
Once they arrived, Johnson and King attempted to rob Meiners, who resisted.  Over 
the course of a fourteen-minute struggle, Johnson and King beat, stabbed, and 
ultimately strangled Meiners to death.  The two then stole cash and electronics from 
Meiners before using his Jeep to dump his body.  Jennifer Mann, Man who admitted 
killing St. Louis County Lawyer gets life without parole, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH 
(March 22, 2013), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/man-who-
admitted-killing-st-louis-county-lawyer-gets-life/article_0f13770d-442c-5719-ab36-
9b4530d1152a.html [https://perma.cc/LH2S-D6TK]. 
 16.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 898. 
 17.  The State was in possession of a recording of the murder.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
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and that he understood the guilty plea would forfeit any rights to trial.20  After 
these affirmations, the State provided this factual basis to support Johnson’s 
guilty plea: 
Judge, had this matter gone to trial, the state would have proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, with readily available witnesses and 
competent evidence that between March 6, 2008, and March 8, 2008, 
here in the City of St. Louis, specifically at the home of Cleophus King 
at 5726 Waterman, [Johnson], acting with Cleophus King, knowingly 
caused the death of [Victim], a friend and acquaintance of [Johnson], 
that they caused [Victim’s] death by strangling, stabbing, and beating 
him, and that they used a knife, multiple knives, weapons, and an 
extension cord on [Victim]. In the course of that, that [Johnson], acting 
with Cleophus King, stole and robbed [Victim] of his wallet, keys to 
his jeep, and that they subsequently went and took those items and the 
victim’s jeep and used the victim’s credit cards contained within his 
wallet to purchase items. And that after killing [Victim] that night, they 
took his body, wrapped him up and dumped him over in Illinois.21 
Johnson affirmed the facts as recited by the State and his satisfaction 
with his counsel’s performance and denied that any threats were made to 
induce his guilty plea.22  The circuit court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and 
imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole, as recommended in 
the plea agreement.23   
Johnson then filed a motion for post-conviction relief and raised three 
issues at his post-conviction relief hearing.24  First, Johnson claimed that he 
was illegally coerced into accepting his plea deal because the State threatened 
him with death, despite the fact that his intellectual disability precluded him 
from receiving that sentence.25  Second, Johnson alleged he was not 
competent to plead guilty and will never be competent.26  Third, Johnson 
argued that his counsel was ineffective because his attorney failed to request 
an independent competency evaluation to which he was entitled.27  Johnson 
introduced evidence regarding his low IQ and the “threats” of the death 
penalty made by his plea.28   
Additionally, Johnson blamed his counsel for failing to challenge the 
State’s competency evaluation by not seeking an independent evaluation.29  
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 899. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id.  Johnson was threatened by the possibility of the death penalty as a 
sentence.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
3
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Johnson’s counsel testified that, although he realized Johnson was “slow,” he 
did not know that Johnson had an intellectual disability.30  Johnson’s attorney 
also denied threatening or encouraging Johnson to accept the plea 
agreement.31  Rather, Johnson’s plea counsel testified that Johnson made his 
decision to accept the plea agreement after discussing it with his family.32  The 
court rejected Johnson’s allegations that he was threatened by his plea counsel 
and overruled Johnson’s motion for post-conviction relief.33  Johnson 
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri ordered transfer.34   
Johnson appealed his sentence on the grounds that he was coerced into 
accepting the State’s plea agreement,35 he was not competent to plead guilty,36 
and his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s 
competency evaluation and failing to seek a second competency evaluation.37  
The majority opinion, written by Judge W. Brent Powell, agreed with the trial 
court that (1) Johnson was not coerced into accepting the State’s plea 
agreement, (2) Johnson was competent to stand trial, and (3) Johnson’s plea 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a second competency 
evaluation.38  Consequently, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.39   
The dissent, written by Judge Laura Denver Stith, found that (1) Johnson 
was coerced, (2) even if competent to stand trial, he was not eligible for the 
death penalty, and (3) his plea counsel was ineffective.40  In particular, the 
dissent found that the evidence presented to the trial court showed that 
Johnson was intellectually disabled, that this intellectual disability made him 
incompetent to accept a plea agreement, and that his counsel was ineffective 
for failing to investigate the extent of his intellectual disability.41  Judge Stith 
would have reversed the judgment of the motion court and either remanded 
the case for trial or held an evidentiary hearing to determine the issue of 
intellectual disability.42   
 
 30.  Id. at 900. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  The transfer was ordered pursuant to MO. R. CIV. P. 83.04.  Id. 
 35.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 900. 
 36.  Id. at 904. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 902, 904.  Because this was an appeal from a Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 
motion for postconviction relief from a guilty plea decided by a motion court as the 
factfinder, the Court reviewed the appeal on a “clearly erroneous” standard.  Id. at 900 
(citing Latham v. State, 554 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)).  
 39.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 908. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 914–21, 923–24. 
 42.  Id. at 928. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The issues surrounding intellectual disability, competency, the death 
penalty, and ineffective assistance of counsel are complex.  When these 
problems are combined with a plea agreement, the analysis becomes even 
more complicated.  To understand how the law has developed around each of 
these issues, it is important to examine them individually.  First, this Part 
examines Missouri competency law and explains its development in state and 
federal law.  Next, this Part examines the Supreme Court of the United States 
cases and Missouri cases addressing death penalty issues in similar contexts.  
Finally, this Part examines the law regarding claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
A. Competency to Stand Trial 
To understand the history of the death penalty and the state of the law it 
is first essential to understand the role competency plays in determining the 
efficacy of a death sentence.  The Supreme Court of Missouri has defined 
competency to stand trial as “[the] defendant [having] the sufficient ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding 
and having a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him.”43  The standards for competency to stand trial are codified by 
statute.44  This statute proscribes conviction or sentencing of any individual 
who does not have the capacity to understand the trial process or adequately 
assist in his or her defense.45  When a judge has reason to believe that a 
defendant lacks capacity, or a motion is filed by either party, the court is 
required to order an examination to determine the issue. 46  Failure of a judge 
to order an examination to determine competency has been held by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to be a violation of a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial.47  In Missouri, if neither party requests a 
second examination, the court may make a finding of competency based on 
the report of the examiner or impanel a jury of six to make a finding of fact 
on the issue.48  Upon a finding that an individual is incompetent to stand trial, 
the court is required to suspend the criminal proceedings and commit the 
individual to the Department of Mental Health.49   
 
 43.  State v. Baumruk, 85 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 44.  MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.1 (2019). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.2 (2019). 
 47.  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 
U.S. 375 (1966)). 
 48.  MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.7 (2019). 
 49.  MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.9 (2019). 
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In the event that incompetency is established before a plea, the 
incompetent individual is also found to be incompetent to plead guilty.50  A 
defendant is presumed to be competent, and the burden of showing 
incompetency is on the defendant.51  A presumption of incompetency cannot 
be created, even if some evidence exists that a defendant suffers from an 
intellectual disability.52  Although defense counsel is allowed to request a 
second examination to determine competency, counsel is not ineffective for 
deciding not to request a second evaluation.53  This presumption of 
competency has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
multiple decisions.54  The only exception to this general rule regarding 
competency is if a mental evaluation report appears deficient or a non-
reported mental defect becomes apparent to defense counsel.  In that case, 
counsel is compelled to seek a further evaluation.55  Rather, sufficient 
evidence of an intellectual disability is only enough to compel defense counsel 
to seek a second mental evaluation.56  A mental defect that would trigger this 
exception is evidence of an intellectual disability.57   
The applicable Missouri statute gives a three-prong test to determine 
whether an individual suffers from an intellectual disability.58  The individual 
must display: (1) a subaverage IQ; (2) extensive deficits in adaptive behaviors 
 
 50.  Hubbard v. State, 31 S.W.3d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the trial 
court’s findings regarding competency of defendant to plead guilty were not clearly 
erroneous because they were based on a sufficient medical report). 
 51.  MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.8 (2019). 
 52.  Baird v. State, 906 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 53.  Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 30 n.6 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); see also 
Bass v. State, 950 S.W.2d 940, 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (reviewing multiple cases 
with this holding). 
 54.  Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (“If a defendant is 
incompetent, due process considerations require suspension of the criminal trial until 
such time, if any, that the defendant regains the capacity to participate in his defense 
and understand the proceedings against him.”); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 
480 (1960) (per curiam). 
 55.  Gooden v. State, 846 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Mo. 1989) (en banc)) (“Absent a perceived 
shortcoming in a mental evaluation report or a manifestation of a mental disease or 
defect not identified by a prior report, an attorney representing a defendant in a 
criminal case is not compelled to seek further evaluation.”). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.1 (2019). 
 58.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.6 (2019) (stating “a condition involving 
substantial limitations in general functioning characterized by significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning with continual extensive related deficits and 
limitations in two or more adaptive behaviors … which conditions are manifested and 
documented before eighteen years of age.”).  State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 153 
(Mo. 2008) (en banc) (“According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders IV (DSM—IV), a person with an I.Q. of 70 or lower has significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning, but it is possible for an individual with an I.Q. 
between 70 and 75 to be diagnosed as mentally retarded ….”). 
6
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that stem from his or her subaverage IQ; and (3) both of the prior prongs must 
have manifested and been documented before the individual reached eighteen 
years of age.59  The Supreme Court of Missouri has adopted these standards 
for determining intellectual disability from the medical community.60 
 In Goodwin v. State, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed which 
types of evidence are sufficient to show that an individual suffers from an 
intellectual disability.61  The court examined the language of the applicable 
statute, which requires “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” as 
that term is defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM-IV”).62  Analyzing the DSM-IV, the court found that IQ 
tests are the standard procedure for determining whether an individual suffers 
from an intellectual disability.63  Using this standard, the Goodwin court found 
that the defendant did not meet the standard for “intellectually disabled,” 
although his IQ was in the mid-seventies to eighties.64  Because Goodwin was 
not “intellectually disabled,” the court did not consider the second prong of 
the statute’s test.65   
While the Goodwin court found the defendant’s IQ score too high to be 
considered intellectually disabled, the court has found slightly lower scores to 
meet the standard.66  Although evidence establishing an intellectual disability 
creates a duty on the part of defense counsel to move for a second mental 
evaluation, intellectual disabilities do not automatically make a defendant 
 
 59.  Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 153.  
 60.  See Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 30–31 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 61.  Id. at 26. 
 62.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.6; Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 30 (Mo. 2006) (en 
banc).  DSM-IV is the abbreviation for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV of 
the American Psychiatric Association.  This manual contains the standards for 
defining psychological disorders in the United States medical community and was 
updated in 2013 to the DSM-V.  CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND 
QUALITY, 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: DSM-5 Changes: 
Implications for Child Serious Emotional Disturbance, June 2016, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK519708/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK519708.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZW9G-L9KX]. 
 63.  Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 30 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 64.  Id. at 31. 
 65.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.6; Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 31 (Mo. 2006) (en 
banc) (“Without evidence that Goodwin’s intellectual functioning is ‘significantly 
subaverage,’ there is no need to move on to a discussion of his adaptive behaviors.”); 
but see Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 31 n.7 (recognizing that IQ test scores are not applied 
mechanically because IQ scores are only one part of the statutory definition). 
 66.  W.J.K. v. K.S.G. (In the Interest of T.T.G.), 530 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Mo. 2017) 
(en banc) (finding an IQ score of 65 sufficient to indicate an intellectual disability); 
State ex rel. Lyons v. Lombardi, 303 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding 
an IQ between 65 and 70 to establish an intellectual disability). 
7
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incompetent to stand trial.67  However, a finding of intellectual disability or 
defect does make an individual ineligible for the death penalty.68 
B. Death Penalty 
Application of the death penalty to intellectually disabled individuals has 
been declared unconstitutional since the Supreme Court of the United States’s 
decision in Atkins v. Virginia.69  The Court came to that decision by 
considering whether the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.70  The ruling was codified in 
Missouri Revised Statute Section 565.030.1, which states, “Where murder in 
the first degree is charged but not submitted or where the state waives the 
death penalty, the submission to the trier and all subsequent proceedings in 
the case shall proceed as in all other criminal cases.”71  The statute further 
states that the trier of fact must determine by a preponderance of the evidence 
whether the defendant is intellectually disabled, with the defendant carrying 
the burden of proof.72  Importantly, these rules apply only during the trial 
process, and the jury makes a finding of intellectual of disability under these 
rules.73  The Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled that prior to a trial for 
murder, the court is not required to determine whether the defendant has an 
intellectual disability unless there is a question as to the defendant’s 
competence to stand trial, even when the defendant is facing the possibility of 
the death penalty.74   
 
 67.  State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (“The standard 
for determining a defendant’s competence to plead guilty is essentially the same as 
that for determining if a defendant is competent to proceed to trial.”); see also Wilson 
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. banc 1991) (“Some degree of intellectual disability 
does not automatically render a defendant incapable of knowingly and voluntarily 
pleading guilty.”); Bryant v. State, 563 S.W.2d 37, 46 (Mo. 1978) (holding that a 
defendant can be found competent to stand trial while suffering from a mental disease 
or defect); Pulliam v. State, 480 S.W.2d 896, 904 (Mo. 1972); Evans v. State, 467 
S.W.2d 920, 923 (Mo. 1971); State v. Lowe, 442 S.W.2d 525, 529–30 (Mo. 1969). 
 68.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). 
 69.  Id. at 321 (holding that the death penalty is excessive punishment for 
individuals with intellectual disabilities and the U.S. Constitution “places a 
substantive restriction on a state’s power to take the life” of an intellectually disabled 
offender). 
 70.  Id. at 352. 
 71.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.1. 
 72.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4(1). 
 73.  MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.1. 
 74.  Davis v. State, 517 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).  Although this 
decision occurred before the Supreme Court of the United States declared the death 
penalty unconstitutional for individuals with intellectual disabilities, subsequent 
appellate decisions have upheld it.  See Cole v. State, 218 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2007). 
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Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has found that the 
threat of the death penalty during plea agreements does not violate any 
constitutional rights of the defendant because it is not coercive.75  The 
Supreme Court of Missouri adopted and expanded upon this ruling.76  The 
court has repeatedly found that to prove a defendant was coerced into pleading 
guilty, he or she must show that his or her counsel gave ineffective advice or 
misled him or her as to the nature of the case.77  Thus, in determining whether 
a defendant has been coerced into pleading guilty to a crime, it is essential to 
analyze the elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In general, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show “(1) counsel’s performance did not conform to the 
degree of skill, care[,] and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and[,] 
(2) he was thereby prejudiced.”78  If the movant is unable to prove one element 
of the test then the court need not consider the other element.79  While this 
general rule remains the same for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
that arise from a guilty plea,80 the Supreme Court of Missouri has changed the 
focus of the factual analysis.81  When an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim arises following a guilty plea, the defendant must show that, but for 
counsel’s actions, he or she would have insisted on going to trial and refused 
to plead guilty.82   
 
 75.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (holding the mere fact that 
appellee would not have pleaded guilty, except for the opportunity to limit the possible 
penalty, did not show that the plea had not resulted from a free and rational choice – 
especially where appellee was represented by competent counsel who advised the plea 
would be to appellee’s advantage due to the great weight of the evidence against him); 
see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Jackson v. State, 585 
S.W.2d 495, 497 n.2 (Mo.  1979) (en banc) (“a threatening [potential punishment] is 
insufficient to render [a] plea involuntary.”); Rice v. State, 585 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Mo. 
1979) (en banc); Burks v. State, 490 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Mo. 1973). 
 76. Beeman v. State, 502 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Mo. 1973); Richardson v. State, 470 
S.W. 2d 479, 484 (Mo. 1971); Wilson v. State, 459 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo. 1970). 
 77.  Beeman, 502 S.W.2d at 256; Richardson, 470 S.W. 2d at 484; Wilson, 459 
S.W.2d at 301. 
 78.  Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
 79.  Johnson v. State, 5 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 80.  Boyd v. State, 205 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Cupp v. 
State, 935 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)) (“To prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where a movant has entered a plea of guilty, a ‘movant must 
show his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that, as a result, he was prejudiced.’”). 
 81.  Cupp, 935 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 82.  Id.; Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). 
9
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In Cooper v. State, the defendant’s counsel advised him to plead guilty 
to charges of theft totaling over $500.83  During the plea hearing, the defendant 
repeatedly stated he was making the plea voluntarily and of his own free 
will.84  After this hearing, the defendant waived his right for post-conviction 
relief in exchange for a reduced sentence of probation.85  When the defendant 
later violated the terms of his probation, he brought an appeal claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s recommendation to 
plead guilty.86  In analyzing his claim, the court looked first to the general rule 
for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.87  The court held that, because 
the claim arose from a guilty plea, “any claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is immaterial to the extent that it impinges upon the voluntariness and 
knowledge with which the plea was made.”88  Based on this analysis, and  the 
defendant’s statement in his plea hearing that he was making the plea 
voluntarily, the court rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.89   
After Cooper, Missouri courts must focus on the defendant’s knowledge 
of the plea terms and the voluntariness of the plea.90  Additionally, Cooper 
indicates that evidence of knowledge and voluntariness can be found from the 
statements of the defendant during the plea hearing.91  While this standard of 
analysis is straightforward in cases involving most defendants, the knowledge 
portion of the analysis becomes more complex when the defendant suffers 
from a mental disease or defect.92  An attorney can be found ineffective for 
failing to investigate an alleged mental disease or defect if there is evidence 
tending to show that the defendant suffered from a mental incapacity at the 
time of his or her plea.93   
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a defendant’s 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights are violated when an attorney fails 
to investigate an alleged mental defect or disease.94  In Strickland v. 
Washington, the Court stated that “[c]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations [of possible mitigating evidence] or to make a reasonable 
decision that [such] investigations [are] unnecessary,”95 and the 
 
 83.  Cooper, 356 S.W.3d at 150. 
 84.  Id. at 150–51. 
 85.  Id. at 152. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 153 (citing State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)); 
see also Matthews v. State, 501 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Mo. 1973); Barylski v. State, 473 
S.W.2d 399, 402 (Mo. 1971) (per curiam). 
 89.  Cooper, 356 S.W.3d at 157. 
 90.  Id. (citing Roll, 942 S.W.2d at 375); see also Matthews, 501 S.W.2d at 47; 
Barylski, 473 S.W.2d at 402. 
 91.  Cooper, 356 S.W.3d at 155. 
 92.  See Roll, 942 S.W.2d at 376. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). 
 95.  Id. 
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reasonableness of the investigation is “based on whether defense counsel’s 
performance conformed to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a 
reasonably competent attorney.”96  Additionally, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has held that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to have 
effective counsel in plea negotiations.97   
Missouri appellate courts have held that a defendant’s counsel is not 
ineffective for advising a defendant to take a plea agreement to avoid the death 
penalty, even when he or she could be ineligible for the death penalty, unless 
there is evidence showing that this was not a “reasonable strategy.”98  
Appellate courts reviewing a claim that defense counsel or a trial court erred 
in failing to move for a mental evaluation prior to a guilty plea are governed 
by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035.99  This rule sets the standard of 
review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims as clearly erroneous.100  
This means the appellate court must accept the lower court’s finding of facts 
unless there is clear evidence of a mistake.101 
 
 96.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 913 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). 
 97.  Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that failure to inform a 
defendant of a plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); see Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that failure to inform a defendant of the 
potential immigration consequences of a plea agreement constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 98.  Thurman v. State, 424 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (holding 
defendant’s counsel was not ineffective because counsel’s advice to plead guilty to 
remove the death sentence as a possible punishment was a reasonable strategy).  Even 
if defendant obtained a pre-trial determination that he suffered from mental retardation 
under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030, life imprisonment without probation or parole was 
the only sentence available under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020.  Id.  See also Baird v. 
State, 906 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding counsel was not ineffective 
for failure to request another mental examination to determine mental competence 
because counsel had nothing to put him on notice that defendant was mentally 
incompetent). 
 99.  MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.035(a) (“A person convicted of a felony on a plea of 
guilty claiming that the conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and 
laws of this state or the constitution of the United States, including claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the court imposing the 
sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in excess 
of the maximum sentence authorized by law may seek relief in the sentencing court 
pursuant to the provisions of this Rule 24.035.”). 
 100.  MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.035(k). 
 101.  In addition to Rule 24.035, appellate review in Missouri is covered by Rule 
84.04.  This rule creates specific requirements for how an appeal should be structured.  
MO. R. CIV. P. 84.04(d)–(e).  Typically, if an issue is incorrectly raised by the parties 
according the procedural requirements of this rule, it will not be considered by a 
Missouri appellate court. 
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IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In Johnson v. State, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling and held in favor of the State by one vote.102  It was a hotly 
contested four-to-five decision.  Judges Wilson, Russell, and Fischer joined 
Judge Powell’s majority opinion, with Judge Stith dissenting, joined by Chief 
Justice Draper and Judge Breckenridge.103  This Part analyzes the decision in 
Johnson in two main parts: Subpart A reviews the majority and Subpart B 
examines the dissent. 
A. Majority 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Johnson alleged that: (1) 
his counsel threatened him to plead guilty by telling him he would receive the 
death penalty even though he was ineligible; (2) he was incompetent to plead 
guilty; and (3) his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a second 
competency evaluation.104  Because Johnson’s appeal arose out of a motion 
for post-conviction relief, the court limited its review to a “clearly erroneous” 
standard.105  In examining the first issue of whether Johnson was coerced into 
accepting the State’s plea agreement, the majority’s analysis focused on the 
standards for guilty plea coercion announced by the court in McMahon v. State 
and Drew v. State.106  In McMahon, the court held that a guilty plea is not 
coerced if it is “intelligently and voluntarily made.”107  Because Johnson 
claimed that his attorney coerced him through the use of threats, the court 
found the standard from Drew applicable.108  The majority found that the 
record does not support any allegations that Johnson was threatened.109   
Specifically, the majority focused on the fact that Johnson felt threatened 
by his attorney’s statement that he would face the death penalty if he were to 
go to trial.110  While Johnson characterized his counsel’s explanation of the 
death penalty as threatening, counsel testified that he had simply explained 
the possibility to Johnson.111  The majority deferred to the  trial court’s finding 
 
 102.  Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 103.  Id. at 908. 
 104.  Id. at 899. 
 105.  Id. at 900. 
 106.  Id. at 901 (citing Drew v. State, 436 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Mo. 1969)); 
McMahon v. State, 569 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). 
 107.  McMahon, 569 S.W.2d at 758. 
 108.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 901  (quoting Drew, 436 S.W.2d at 729) (explaining 
that Johnson must show he was “induced to plead guilty by fraud or mistake, by 
misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the holding out of hopes which prove to be false 
or ill founded.”). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 902. 
 111.  Id. at 924–25. 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/8
2020] RESTRICTIONS ON APPEALS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABLITIES 815 
that counsel’s testimony was credible.112  Citing multiple prior decisions, the 
court found that informing a defendant of the possible punishments he might 
face does not amount to coercion.113  Based on this analysis, the court held 
that Johnson’s trial counsel had not coerced him into pleading guilty through 
the use of a threat.114  
Next, the court discussed Johnson’s second argument that his counsel 
advised him he was eligible for the death penalty when he was, in fact, 
ineligible.115  The majority acknowledged that had Johnson been found to be 
intellectually disabled, he would have been ineligible for the death penalty 
under the Supreme Court of the United States’s ruling in Atkins.116  Judge 
Powell, however, pointed out that a finding of intellectual disability is not 
automatic, but rather, must be determined by the factfinder, with the burden 
of proof resting on the defendant.117  Thus, because no factfinder had yet 
found Johnson to be intellectually disabled, his counsel was required to inform 
him of the possibility of the death penalty.118  Moreover, because the State 
was not required to waive the death penalty, death was still “on the table” until 
Johnson entered a guilty plea.119  The majority stressed that despite evidence 
that Johnson may have been intellectually disabled, the jury may have rejected 
such a finding.120  Although the court concluded that there was no clear error, 
the majority did find that “Johnson’s counsel could have more fully 
investigated Johnson’s intellectual capacity and advised Johnson of this 
defense, any additional investigation or advice by counsel bears no direct 
correlation to Johnson’s decision to accept the State’s offer and plead 
guilty.”121  
After settling the issue of intellectual disability, the majority next 
addressed Johnson’s argument that he was incompetent to plead guilty.122  The 
majority first considered the evidence presented by Johnson at his post-
conviction motion hearing that “he had an IQ of 63,” and “while . . . capable 
of conversing with his attorney, he did not possess the intellectual capacity to 
meaningfully assist his attorney in his defense.”123  However, the court again 
deferred to the testimony of Johnson’s plea counsel, who stated that 
 
 112.  Id. at 901. 
 113.  Id. (citing State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 406 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc)); see also Jackson, 585 S.W.2d at 497 n.2; Rice, 585 S.W.2d at 493; Burks, 
490 S.W.2d at 35. 
 114.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 901. 
 115.  Id. at 902. 
 116.  Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, (2002)). 
 117.  Id. at 902–03 (citing State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo. 2008) (en 
banc)). 
 118.  Id. at 903. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 907. 
 121.  Id. at 903. 
 122.  Id. at 904. 
 123.  Id. 
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“[Johnson] was able to repeat and rephrase information . . . demonstrating 
[that he] understood the nature of the proceedings and could assist in his 
defense.”124  In addition to this, the majority pointed out that a competency 
exam conducted pursuant to Section 552.020 concluded Johnson was 
competent to stand trial.125  The majority found the weight of the evidence 
indicated that Johnson was competent to enter a guilty plea.126 
Next, the majority turned to the last issue Johnson raised on appeal, 
whether his plea counsel was ineffective for declining to seek a second 
competency evaluation.127  Citing the relevant statute, the majority reiterated 
that determining competency is a preliminary question for the judge to 
address.128  The majority found that, although a second evaluation of 
competency is allowed, defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to request 
a second exam when there are no other extenuating factors.129  In Johnson’s 
case, there had been a competency evaluation performed pursuant to Section 
552.020 in which Doctor Armour “. . . concluded Johnson did not suffer any 
mental disease or defect and that he was not intellectually disabled to an extent 
that limited his ability to understand the proceedings against him or to assist 
in his own defense.”130  In addition to this, at his post-conviction motion 
hearing, Johnson’s plea counsel had testified that he was capable of 
participating in his defense.131  The majority held these facts show there were 
no extenuating circumstances that would have required Johnson’s plea 
counsel to seek a second competency evaluation.132  The majority affirmed 
the denial of post-conviction relief for three reasons. First, the 
motion court found that Johnson’s plea counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to request a second competency examination. Second, 
Johnson’s plea counsel believed he was competent to stand trial. 
Third, an experienced psychologist evaluated Johnson and found 
him to be competent..133 
 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020 (2019)). 
 129.  Id. at 905. 
 130.  Id. (emphasis added).  In this instance, the court’s assertion that Dr. Armour 
found Johnson not to be intellectually disabled when, in the prior section of the 
opinion, the court explicitly stated that intellectual disability is a question that is to be 
determined by the fact finder, points to a confusion of the standards for competence 
and intellectual disability.  See id. at 903, 905.  Furthermore, Judge Stith’s dissent 
pointed out that Dr. Armour did find that Johnson suffered from “mild mental 
retardation” in his report.  Id. at 922. 
 131.  Id. at 905. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 905–06. 
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B. Dissent 
In her dissent, Judge Stith asserted that the majority opinion failed to 
analyze the merits of the case because it did not address all the issues raised 
in Johnson’s appeal.134  In its first point of analysis, the dissent argued that 
Johnson successfully preserved the issue that his counsel failed to inform him 
of an intellectual disability defense.135  The dissent found that the arguments 
raised by Johnson in the post-conviction relief hearing were sufficient to 
preserve the argument for appellate review.136  Thus, the dissent established 
that Johnson had preserved his claim on appeal, or that the court was allowed 
to look past the point relied on and decide the case on the merits.137  The 
dissent next argued that the majority opinion misunderstood the difference 
between intellectual disability and competency to stand trial.138 
At the time of Johnson’s plea, the Supreme Court of the United States 
and the Supreme Court of Missouri had held that an incompetent person could 
not go to trial or be convicted.139  Competency is described as an individual 
having sufficient ability to consult with counsel.140  Intellectual disability is 
based on clinical standards and disqualifies an individual from receiving the 
death penalty.141  Competency is governed by state laws, but the Supreme 
Court has held that states are limited by clinical guidance in determining there 
definition of intellectual disability..142  The determinations of competency and 
intellectual disability are made by the court and based on separate types of 
evidence.143  Although definitionally and functionally different, these two 
concepts may overlap.144  The evidence Johnson offered at his post-conviction 
relief hearing showed that Johnson’s IQ was between fifty-three and sixty-
 
 134.  Id. at 908 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 135.  Id. at 909–10. 
 136.  Id. at 912.  The dissent justified its finding that Johnson’s argument is 
preserved for review by citing relevant case law and language found in MO. R. CRIM. 
P. 24.035(k).  Id. at 910 (citing MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.035(k)).  The dissent claimed the 
issue should have been examined by the court even if not raised or preserved because 
Rule 84.12(c) allows the court to review an issue under the plain error standard 
discretionarily.  Id. at 913 (citing MO. SUP CT. R. 84.13(c)).  However, the majority 
addressed Judge Stith’s analysis and found no reason to read past the issue raised in 
the appellate brief because no argument was readily apparent.  Id. at 906–08 (majority 
opinion).  The argument based on appellate procedure will not be further discussed as 
it is outside the scope of this note. 
 137.  Id. at 914 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See id. (citing State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 507 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)); 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 140.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 914 (citing State, 879 S.W.2d  at 507). 
 141.  Id. at 902 (majority opinion) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318). 
 142.  Id. at 916 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 143.  Id. at 914–17. 
 144.  Id. at 914. 
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three.145  The dissent concluded that he met the definition of “intellectually 
disabled” under Missouri case law, and that his counsel, apparently ignorant 
of the law, only moved for a finding of incompetency.146   
In addition to this, both Dr. Armour and Dr. Fucetola diagnosed Johnson 
with “mild mental retardation” in addition to multiple non-adaptive 
behaviors.147  Because these findings – when viewed in light of Missouri case 
law – show that a factfinder would have likely found Johnson to be 
intellectually disabled, the dissent found that the majority opinion and the 
post-conviction relief court used the wrong test for assessing counsel’s 
mishandling of intellectual disability issues.148  Judge Stith concluded that the 
findings of the post-conviction relief court regarding Johnson’s intellectual 
disability were clearly erroneous.149  
Finally, the dissent examined the record regarding the plea counsel’s 
understanding of intellectual disability.150  The dissent noted that Johnson’s 
plea counsel is on record as using the terms “competency” and “intellectual 
disability” interchangeably.151  His interchangeable use of the terms indicates 
that he did not understand what “intellectual disability” means.152  The dissent 
further state that because plea counsel did not understand the significance of 
Johnson’s intellectual disability, he did not properly advise Johnson about the 
defense of intellectual disability to the death penalty.153  Therefore, Johnson 
was misinformed and coerced into accepting a life sentence through his plea 
counsel’s failure to completely inform him of a possible defense to the death 
penalty.154  Had Johnson been properly informed, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and, therefore, he was prejudiced by counsel’s inept performance.155  
Based on these findings, the dissent concluded that the court should sustain 
Johnson’s motion for post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, vacate his sentence to life without the possibility of 
parole, and grant him a new trial, or alternatively, remand for a new 
evidentiary hearing.156 
 
 145.  Id. at 908. 
 146.  Id. at 909, 919. 
 147.  Dr. Armour made this finding during his initial competency evaluation, and 
Dr. Fucetola later made the same finding during the admission of post-trial evidence.  
Id. at 917.  The dissent asserted that these two facts could be found in the post-
conviction plea hearing record.  Id. at 917–19. 
 148.  Id. at 919. 
 149.  Id. at 909. 
 150.  Id. at 921–23. 
 151.  Id. at 921. 
 152.  Id. at 922–23. 
 153.  Id. at 923–24. 
 154.  Id. at 924. 
 155.  Id. at 925–26. 
 156.  Id. at 928. 
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V. COMMENT 
 The majority’s holding in Johnson condemns an intellectually disabled 
defendant  to a life sentence without parole  – a sentence he did not deserve.157  
The majority in Johnson held that an individual can only be found 
intellectually disabled by a factfinder during trial.158  In effect, this subjects a 
person who is truly intellectually disabled to the death penalty unless he or 
she decides to take the case to trial and allow a factfinder to determine the 
issue.159  While the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the threat 
of the death penalty during plea negotiations is not unduly coercive,160  it has 
also held that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel during plea negotiations.161  The majority’s decision fails to follow 
the Sixth Amendment’s requirements given by the Supreme Court of the 
United States by finding Johnson’s attorney effective even when his testimony 
indicated that he did not perceive Johnson to be intellectually disabled – even 
though two separate experts found that he was – and he failed to investigate 
any additional relevant law.162  
 The ruling in Johnson will have a negative effect on intellectually 
disabled individuals in criminal proceedings by lowering the standard for 
effective assistance of counsel for criminal defense attorneys and by changing 
the nature of plea negotiations in Missouri criminal law.  Subpart A of this 
Part analyzes the inherent unfairness of this ruling to Ronald Johnson.  
Subpart B looks at the effect this ruling will have on the law in Missouri 
regarding individuals with intellectual disabilities. 
A. The Court’s Ruling in Johnson Creates Dangerous Precedent for 
Proving Intellectual Disability 
 The court’s interpretation for the requirements of proving intellectual 
disability creates an illogical burden on intellectually disabled individuals 
during the guilty plea stage.  In Johnson, the court found that only a factfinder 
can make a determination of intellectual disability.163  Interpreting applicable 
Missouri law, the court found that the burden of proof for intellectual 
 
 157.  Id. at 928. 
 158.  Id. at 902–03 (majority opinion). 
 159.  Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 150.); see also MO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 565.005.1, 565.020.2. 
 160.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970). 
 161.  Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that failure to inform a 
defendant of a plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); see Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that failure to inform a defendant of the 
potential immigration consequences of a plea agreement constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 162.  See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 906. 
 163.  Id. at 902–03. 
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disability is on the defendant.164  Thus, until a defendant proceeds to trial and 
raises the issue of intellectual disability, and then receives a ruling on that 
issue, he is not considered intellectually disabled.165  Because the Supreme 
Court of the United States has ruled executions of intellectually disabled 
individuals unconstitutional, this leaves defense counsel whose client’s IQ is 
on the margin of what constitutes an intellectual disability in a difficult 
situation during plea negotiations.166  In cases like this one, where a 
defendant’s IQ is well below the standard for intellectual disability, the 
prosecutor’s coercive power is even more pronounced unless defense counsel 
is required to investigate his or her client’s intellectual abilities or be 
extremely well versed in the law.   
The prosecutor can threaten the defendant with the death penalty unless 
he or she pleads guilty, and defense counsel cannot convince the client that 
the death penalty would not be allowed.  This, in turn, provides an unfair 
advantage to the prosecution in plea negotiations, where defense counsel are 
already notoriously disadvantaged.167  If the prosecution knows or has reason 
to know that a defendant is intellectually disabled, they can still push for the 
death penalty.168  Defense counsel in this case must tell the client that he or 
she might face the death penalty if he or she is not found to be intellectually 
disabled.  Although defense counsel with proper time and resources would 
properly investigate, find evidence that the defendant does qualify as 
intellectually disabled, and advise the defendant accordingly, a rushed or 
overworked public defender might not.  For most criminal defense attorneys 
who already suffer from a lack of training when dealing with mentally 
impaired defendants,169 this ruling requires more time and expense to provide 
an adequate defense which only furthers a criminal defendant’s 
disadvantages.170  Furthermore, because a finding of intellectual disability is 
to be made by the court, in close cases, a defense counsel utilizing a cost-
benefit analysis would have to advise their client about the dangers of proving 
intellectual disability versus taking the plea agreement.  Thus, the prosecution 
 
 164.  Id. at 903; see MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.005.1, 565.020.2. 
 165.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 903. 
 166.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 355 (holding that the death penalty is excessive 
punishment for individuals with intellectual disabilities and the U.S. Constitution 
places a substantive restriction on a state’s power to take the life of an intellectually 
disabled offender). 
 167.  Gregory G. Sarno, Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal 
client regarding plea bargaining, 8 A.L.R. 4TH 660 (Originally published in 1981, 
updated weekly); Joseph L. Hoffman, Mary L. Kahn & Steven W. Fisher, Plea 
Bargaining in The Shadow of Death, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2001). 
 168.  See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 903. 
 169.  See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in 
Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the 
Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 74 (1988). 
 170.  See Evan G. Hall, The House Always Wins: Systemic Disadvantage for 
Criminal Defendants and the Case against the Prosecutorial Veto, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1717 (2017). 
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gains the advantage of being able to use an inapplicable penalty to procure a 
plea agreement when defense counsel is not aware of the law regarding 
intellectual disability.  While the court’s interpretation creates a paradox for 
intellectually disabled individuals during the plea negotiation stage of a trial, 
it also muddles the law of competency. 
It is settled law in Missouri that a finding of intellectual disability does 
not prevent a finding of competency to stand trial or plead guilty.171  In its 
examination of the evidence of Johnson’s mental evaluation for competency, 
the court deferred to the finding of the lower court that, although Johnson 
produced evidence that he had an IQ of between fifty-three and sixty-three 
and suffered from schizophrenia, a psychologist found him competent to stand 
trial.172 
This same psychologist, however, also made a finding that Johnson 
would qualify as “mentally retarded” under the applicable medical diagnostic 
criteria.173  Even so, the court found this evidence to apply only to a finding 
of competency.174  While Johnson’s counsel reviewed enough of his client’s 
records to determine that there may have been some question of his ability to 
plead guilty, he had no knowledge of the implications of intellectual disability 
or the possible defenses it could provide and failed to ask for a determination 
on the issue.175  Not only did the majority opinion not consider this, but it 
made an explicit finding that Johnson’s attorney’s testimony that he felt 
Johnson was just  “a little slow” was more persuasive than the medical reports 
that Johnson offered to show his intellectual disability.176   
By confusing the standards for competency and intellectual disability, 
the court in Johnson established a system for analysis in Missouri in which a 
defendant may be declared intellectually disabled but competent to plead 
guilty and then also be required to go to trial to determine that he or she is, in 
fact, intellectually disabled.177  This paradox could be prevented by allowing 
a competency hearing to also function as a hearing on intellectual disability.  
Alternatively, the rules should be changed to allow a judge to decide 
intellectual disability before the beginning of the trial.  In addition to 
preventing this paradox, either of these options would also speed up the trial 
process by allowing a finding on both issues in one hearing.  While a single 
hearing on both of these issues would require different types of evidence, the 
experts used for either of these examinations would be proficient in providing 
both.  The fundamental problem in this case, however, is that Johnson’s 
counsel was ignorant of the law regarding intellectual disability.178 
 
 171.  See State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); Wilson v. 
State, 813 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 172.  Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 904. 
 173.  Id. at 917 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 174.  Id. at 904 (majority opinion). 
 175.  See id. at 919 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 176.  Id. at 905, 909 (majority opinion). 
 177.  See id. at 914 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 178.  See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 909 (majority opinion). 
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By rejecting Johnson’s other claim on appeal that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a second competency evaluation, the court 
creates a problematic precedent on two separate issues.179  Based on the plea 
counsel’s testimony that he did not think Johnson was slow, the trial court 
found counsel not ineffective.180  The majority then held that this ruling was 
not clearly erroneous.181  Finding this evidence sufficient creates a dangerous 
precedent for two reasons.  First, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
held that, when facing the death penalty, a defendant has a constitutional right 
to expert testimony in determining whether they have an intellectual 
disability.182  By accepting the testimony of Johnson’s attorney as sufficient 
to show that he was ineffective, this constitutional standard is ignored.183  
Second, in this case, there is evidence to show that counsel should have 
reasonably suspected that Johnson was disabled and that he did not understand 
the law regarding intellectual disability.184  
 These two issues create a precedent that not only ignores constitutional 
law but allows courts to ignore the relevant facts of the case.  This holding 
places considerable difficulties on an appeal based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel for intellectually disabled individuals because they will need to 
overcome any statements of their prior counsel that they were competent.185  
Additionally, allowing a finding that this kind of self-serving evidence is 
persuasive encourages an attorney to lie, even if they know they have been 
ineffective.  This type of pressure on attorneys encourages them not only to 
act unethically, but also to put their own professional well-being over the 
freedom of a client. 
 Considering the findings of the court in Johnson, it is clear that 
defendants with intellectual disabilities in Missouri must now overcome more 
hurdles than ever before.  First, a defendant’s counsel must engage in unfair 
plea negotiations and advise their clients based on uncertainties in sentencing 
that could mean life or death.186  Second, an intellectually disabled individual 
must convince his or her counsel to request specific hearings into both 
competency and intellectual disability, while hoping that the court is able to 
discern a difference between the two.187  Third, if his or her counsel does fail 
to request the proper hearings, an intellectually disabled individual must make 
an exaggerated showing of his or her intellectual disability on appeal to prevail 
in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Finally, appellate attorneys 
must be technically precise in their drafting of points relied on or, regardless 
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 183.  See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 900, 902. 
 184.  See id. at 917–19 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 185.  See id. at 900, 902 (majority opinion). 
 186.  See id. at 902–03. 
 187.  See id. at 914, 920–21 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
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of the merits or injustices of the case, the Supreme Court of Missouri will not 
consider the issue.188  
B. The Court’s Ruling in Johnson was Inherently Unfair to the 
Defendant 
The court’s ruling in Johnson is unfair because it misinterpreted, 
misapplied, and ignored the relevant law, thereby denying Johnson the 
opportunity to have his case heard on the merits.  In Johnson’s first issue 
raised on appeal, he claimed that he was coerced by his plea counsel into 
pleading guilty by threat of death penalty.189  The majority analyzed this issue 
on the basis that a plea bargain is valid as long as it was voluntarily and 
intelligently made.190  While the court determined that, based on the evidence 
provided at the post-conviction relief hearing by plea counsel, Johnson made 
the plea voluntarily.191  However, their legal analysis of what constitutes 
“voluntary” in giving a plea is flawed.  In determining whether a plea 
agreement is coercive, the court found that “the fact that the maximum 
authorized punishment for a certain crime may be a threatening alternative in 
itself does not render a plea involuntary.”192  Referring to prior decisions, the 
court held that voluntariness of a plea cannot be attacked on a basis that the 
defendant feared the death penalty.193  Thus, Johnson’s claim of coercion had 
to fail because the death penalty was the maximum authorized punishment for 
the crime of first-degree murder.194   
While this analysis seems straightforward, the court’s flawed holding of 
what evidence is required to prove that a defendant suffers from an intellectual 
disability, as discussed above, changes the analysis.  During Johnson’s two 
mental evaluations for competency, both psychologists found Johnson to be 
“mentally retarded.”195  Additionally, Johnson introduced evidence at his 
post-conviction relief hearing that he had an IQ of between fifty-three and 
sixty-three.196  Although the court refused to consider this evidence, it clearly 
indicates that Johnson is intellectually disabled under Missouri case law.197  
Because of this, Johnson would have been ineligible for the death penalty.198  
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 192.  Id. (citing Jackson, 585 S.W.2d at 497 n.2). 
 193.  Id. at 902 (citing Jackson, 585 S.W.2d at 497 n.2). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 917 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 196.  Id. at 908. 
 197.  W.J.K., 530 S.W.3d at 496 (finding an IQ score of 65 sufficient to indicate 
an intellectual disability); State ex rel. Lyons v. Lombardi, 303 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Mo. 
2010) (en banc) (holding an IQ between 65 and 70 to establish an intellectual 
disability). 
 198.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
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Therefore, the death penalty would not have been the “maximum authorized 
punishment.”199  Thus, when Johnson’s counsel told him that he was eligible 
for the death penalty during the plea-bargaining process, it would have been 
coercive.200 
Additionally, even if the plea-bargaining process was not coercive, it 
violated Johnson’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  
The majority in this case failed to consider the claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in relation to Johnson’s intellectual disability based on technical 
failures of his appellate counsel.201  However, they admitted in their opinion 
that Johnson’s plea counsel could have done more to investigate Johnson’s 
potential intellectual disability.202  Moreover, there is ample evidence from 
competency evaluations and plea counsel’s own testimony that he was 
ignorant of the law regarding intellectual disability.203  Thus, by refusing to 
consider the merits of the issue raised in the direct appeal because of a 
technical deficiency, the majority violates Johnson’s constitutional rights.204 
Based on the analysis above, it is clear that because the court 
misinterpreted, misapplied, and ignored the relevant law, it incorrectly found 
that Johnson’s appeal failed, thereby treating Johnson unfairly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling in Johnson substantially affects 
the rights of the intellectually disabled in Missouri.  By finding that Johnson, 
a man who is undoubtedly intellectually disabled, did not receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to consider or advise him of a 
diminished capacity offense or of his ability to use his disability as a defense 
to the death penalty, the court lowered the standard of competency required 
by defense counsel.205  While the evidence at his post-conviction hearing 
clearly showed him to be intellectually disabled, the court focused instead on 
the technical faults in his appellate brief and confused the law of competency 
and intellectual disability to uphold the rulings of the lower courts.206  While 
this particular decision affects only one man, its misstatement of law will 
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